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Reid on Our Mental Constitution
Claire Etchegaray
In the introduction to the Inquiry into the HumanMind (1764), Reid defined “the
anatomy of the mind” as the analysis that “finds out the simple and original
principles of man’s constitution, of which no account can be given but the will
of our Maker” (Reid, 1997: 13–15). According to him, observation and intro-
spective reflection on experience of mental operations offered the only way in
which anatomists of the mind could identify general facts of perceptual belief.¹
He labelled them as “principles of common sense”:
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature
leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common
concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the
principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call
absurd. (Reid, 1997: 33; emphasis added)
In the conclusion to the Inquiry, he introduced additional beliefs rooted in the
natural constitution “called the common sense of mankind” (Reid, 1997: 215),
which he later developed in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers (1785). Thus,
Reid attributed the existence of self-evident beliefs to the virtue of our constitu-
tion. His treatment of the constitution in the anatomy of the mind, however,
might be puzzling. Is the constitution of the mind hidden or observable? For
Reid, it represents the nature by which mental operations are performed, and
which can only be examined through these operations. In other words, it is
known only in part—through its phenomena. This limitation introduces the
question of why not restrict inquiries to the natural operations of the mind
without mentioning this unknown constitution.² Reid’s encounter with this
¹ See Wood 1994, 2004, 2015; Broadie 2002.
² Hume seems to be more cautious in the introduction of the Treatise, by saying that “the essence
of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies [ . . . ] any hypothesis, that
problem was unexceptional with the terminology “by the original constitution”
broadly used in the age of Enlightenment.
The phrase “original constitution” was closely connected to a form of
nescience inspired by Newton’s comments on the cause of gravitation in the
“General Scholium” of the Principia mathematica and in Query 31 of the
Opticks, which influenced different meanings in medicine and the science of
mind.³ In experimental philosophy, anatomists of the mind repurposed the
meaning of the term “constitution”. John Locke, for example, argued we have
no knowledge of the real constitution of things and experience provides only 
knowledge of nominal essences.⁴ In the Aberdonian tradition, George Turnbull 
held that an “inquiry into the facts and real constitutions” was possible by 
applying Baconian natural history and Newton’s regulae philosophandi. He 
also believed that such an inquiry revealed the natural order created by God.⁵ 
David Fordyce argued in the preliminaries of the Elements of Moral Philosophy 
(1754) that “moral philosophy enquires, not how man might have been, but 
how he is constituted”. Consequently, he claimed that “to determine the office, 
duty or destination of man [ . . . ] we must inspect his constitution” (Fordyce, 
1990: 8).
Reid, who was a student of Turnbull, did not reveal any concerns about the 
objection that the “constitution” referred to some occult cause. Of qualities that 
were immediately perceived in matter but whose nature we ignore, such as 
secondary qualities, disorders we feel in our bodies and powers of bodies whether 
mechanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable, he claimed that “[t]o call a 
thing occult, if we attend to the meaning of the word, is rather modestly to 
confess ignorance, than to cloke it” (Reid, 2002a: 216). Like in the science of 
nature, an anatomist of the mind can refer to a thing of which its constitution is
pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as 
presumptuous and chimerical” (Hume, 2000: 5).
³ In  medicine  the  “constitution” represented the contrivance of a healthy body or 
the nature of a part of the living body. The Latin ‘constitutio’ translates the Greek notion 
of kataskeue, as in the  title of Galen’s work  De optima corporis nostri 
constitutione. This medical  sense is also the one to which Chambers exclusively refers in his 
Cyclopedia, apart from the  political sense (Chambers, 1728: 312). On the debates aroused 
by the appeal to an original power (a power that the thing has “by its constitution”) in 
physics, see Duchesneau, 1982 and Wright, 1990.
⁴ According to Locke, nominal essences “are made by the mind and not by nature” (Locke, 1975: 
453). Yet “they are not made [ . . . ] arbitrarily” because the mind, in making its complex ideas of 
substances, “only follows nature”. That is, the mind only joins particular ideas that are “supposed to 
have an union in nature” (455).
⁵ See his graduation thesis, De scientiae naturalis cum philosophia morali conjunctione (1723), and 
The Principles of Moral Philosophy (1740: 2).
1. We might say that by virtue of the constitution of the mind, there are some
principles of belief that are self-evident.⁹ If so, it does not matter whether
God created our mental constitution, which could just as well have been
produced by chance, determinism, or evolution. The point is that this
constitution of the mind enables us to judge self-evident things.
2. Alternatively, because God created the mental constitution, the mind fol-
lows God’s laws, which are never deceitful, as a common sense power to
judge self-evident things.
⁶ Reid thinks that Descartes’ excessive distrust of an “obscure something, which is supposed to be
the subject or substratum of the [material] qualities” leads him to wrongly identify material
substance as the essential attribute of extension (Reid, 2002a: 120–4).
⁷ James Harris had shown that the inquiry into the mind is more quickly stopped than the inquiry
into material nature. Copenhaver stresses that the laws of nature have the same status in each realm:
in both cases they are “contingently necessary” (Copenhaver, 2006: 455). See Bradford Bow’s
Introduction to this volume.
⁸ The medical use may be a paradigm of the intertwining theistic and philosophical connotations.
For Reid, the contrivance of the body is a sign of our origin. Significantly, he refers to Galen to
illustrate the first principle of necessary truths, that design and intelligence in the cause may be
inferred with certainty from marks or signs in the effect (Reid, 2002a: 510).
⁹ Self-evident beliefs, for Reid, are expressed in propositions “which are no sooner understood
than they are believed” (Reid, 2002a: 452).
unknown without imagining a refuge of ignorance.⁶ He cannot know its nature 
independently from its qualities but he can conceive this unknown nature. In 
particular, he identifies regular relations between things without being able to 
observe how their natures are connected. He only de facto observes that this is the 
case. These relations are general facts. Nonetheless, natural philosophy provides 
explanations, because these facts are necessary and are produced by a genuine 
power (a causal one), which cannot be exerted by inanimate or material agents.⁷ 
As in other Aberdonians’ views, Reid’s defence of experimental philosophy was 
grounded on theism with God as the first cause of all creation.⁸ From the belief 
that things were “the creatures of God”, Reid argued, “they have a real essence, or 
constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow; but this essence our 
faculties do not comprehend” (Reid, 2002a: 303).
The suspicion that this notion of the constitution disguises a refuge of ignor-
ance reappears more seriously in Reid’s philosophy of mind. Indeed, his analysis 
of mental faculties takes for granted the truth of the operation that it examines. 
The description of our mental operations implies that they enable us to know, 
according to him. For instance, perception should be studied as the ability to 
perceive reality itself. In this aim his reference to our constitution seems to 
account for his anti-scepticism along two diverging perspectives.
I. In What Way Does Knowledge Depend
on Our Constitution?
In an unpublished and undated manuscript “Of constitution”, Reid claimed that
truth depends on “the constitution of the things” in general, and not on “our”
constitution in particular. Only the discernment or perception of truth is relative
to the knowing mind. Reid argued:
The truth of any proposition cannot depend upon the constitution; we except proposi-
tions in which the mind or some of its powers or operations is the subject of the
proposition. But here we ought to distinguish between the truth of a proposition and
my discernment of that truth. When truths are immediately assented to by all men as they
are apprehended without instruction or reasoning, it may I think be said with PROPRI-
ETY that the power by which we perceive the truth of the propositions is a part of our
constitution. (Reid, n.d.: f.2)
Although the first sentence is elliptic, the context makes clear that Reid means
that the truth of any proposition does not depend on the constitution of the
knowing mind. Truth depends on the constitution of the thing, which is expressed
by some substantive representing the subject of a proposition. (That every
adjective must belong to some substantive is a grammatical first principle. The
¹⁰ In addition to the epigraphs in the Inquiry and the Intellectual Powers, see the numerous
hypostatic formulae (Reid, 1997: 174; 2002a: 198, 205, 226, 575).
Both accounts represent plausible explanations of Reid’s intended meaning 
that “common sense is purely the gift of Heaven” (Reid, 2002a: 433).¹⁰ In the first 
account, the acceptance of a perceptual belief requires no other reason than the 
perception itself. In this way, Reid’s response to scepticism develops independ-
ently from his theistic convictions. The second account is an alternative explan-
ation that credits theism as justification of natural beliefs. Both accounts, 
however, beg the question by referring to our mental constitution as an already 
truthful constitution of the knowing subject. This chapter sheds new light on 
Reid’s reference to our mental constitution by distinguishing his approach from 
subjectivism, and then showing the way in which Reid treated the discernment of 
truth (and not truth itself) as a product of “our constitution”. These important 
distinctions explain the proper sense in which the mind is a subject of knowledge 
in Reid’s anatomy of the mind.
(Reid, n.d.: 5)
substantive denotes the subject of a proposition. This subject is not a self or an 
agent of knowledge. It is a thing.) Reid believed that everything “as it is made 
has a constitution [ . . . ]  from which all its qualities, appearances, powers and 
operations do result” (Reid, n.d.: f.2). When the mind or an operation of the mind 
is the subject of a proposition, truth depends on the mental constitution, that is, 
the constitution of the substratum (or the support of observable qualities). But 
the discernment of that truth must be distinguished from the truth of the 
proposition.
Remarkably, in this context, the “subject” meant a support, not a self or an 
agent. Sir William Hamilton’s later editorial interpretation of Reid’s philoso-phy 
attempted to disentangle this old notion of subjectum as a knowing subject and a 
known object. Reid indeed wrote “the distinction between things in the mind 
and things external, is not meant to signify the place of the things we speak of, 
but their subject” (Reid, 1854b: 221b). Hamilton commented on the distinction 
between “things in the mind” and “things external” by saying that it covers the 
distinction between the thing that is id in quo and the thing that is id circa quod.
In a statement typical of late modern thought, Hamilton identified the former as 
the subject, the latter as the object. He added that “in psychological language, 
the subject absolutely is the mind that knows or thinks—i.e. the mind 
considered as the subject of knowledge or thought; the object that which is 
known, or thought about” (ibid.). Starting from Hamil-ton’s metaphysical 
distinction, the philosophical task is to understand how the subject can know 
the object. Certainly Reid’s philosophy offered implicit answers to this question. 
But this formula inserts an opposition between the subject and the object that 
could be misleading to understand Reid’s use of  “constitution” in the 
philosophy of the mind. At the end of this chapter, we shall recall this point in 
order to distinguish Reid’s process from Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies of 
mind.
When, at the beginning of the Inquiry, Reid wrote that Hume “leaves nothing in 
nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may be 
impressed” or that the sensation is related to “the mind, its subject” (Reid, 1997: 
20, 40, my italics), he meant only that the mind is the thing in which the sensation 
exists. In the manuscript, Reid clarified:
As every truth expresses some attribute of a thing, or some relation between two or more 
things, the truth depends on the nature of the thing whose attribute is expressed. The 
truth of this proposition that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends upon the constitution of a 
lion, and upon nothing else. The truth of this proposition, that the sun is greater than the 
moon, depends upon the magnitude of the sun and the moon, and upon nothing else.
In the case of the moral propositions, since the mind is their subject (in Reid’s 
strict sense), their truth (not only our discernment) depends on the constitution 
of the human mind. But their truth does not depend on our discernment. Reid 
explicitly said: “the truth of the proposition as well our perception of that truth 
must be resolved into the constitution of the mind nor does this in my opinion 
open any door to scepticism” (Reid, n.d., f.2). His reasons for stipulating that this 
did not “open any door to scepticism” require further examination.
A moral proposition could be understood in the restricted sense of an ethical 
proposition, or as a proposition about human nature more broadly. But in any 
case a moral truth is not subjective. At first sight, Reid targeted Hume. Never-
theless Paul Wood’s chapter in this volume offers an alternative explanation.¹¹ In 
“Of constitution”, perhaps Reid responded to critics claiming that his appeal to 
common sense as “a part of our constitution” led to scepticism. Joseph 
Priestley’s An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry (1774) turned Reid’s own 
argument against him. Priestley criticized that the “unknown something” called 
“common sense” reduces every judgment, either moral or factual, to feelings. If 
Priestley was correct in this criticism, Reid’s references to the facts of our mental 
constitution resembled exactly what he ridiculed about Hume’s system.¹²
Hume claimed in the Abstract of the Treatise that passion and belief are kinds 
of “natural instinct, derived from nothing but the original constitution of the 
human mind” (Hume, 2000: 408). In the second and the third books of the 
Treatise, he appealed to our natural constitution, first by referring to Francis 
Hutcheson but afterwards, step by step, by subverting the Hutchesonian account. 
Hume first wrote that “the most probable hypothesis which has been advan’d to 
explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral rights and 
obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and 
passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce pain, and others in like 
manner excite pleasure” (Hume, 2000: 194).¹³ He still appeared to agree with 
Hutcheson when he claimed there are “certain instincts originally implanted in 
our nature” and gave these examples: “benevolence and resentment, the love of 
life and kindness to children, or the general appetite to good and aversion to evil”
¹¹ See Chapter 8.
¹² This is a clue to the solution of James McCosh’s puzzle: “the paper is the dimmest and 
yellowest of all: looks old. Query: when written?” (McCosh, 1875: 444). McCosh had suggested 
that the paper was an early manuscript (442). But it may have been written after 1774. I thank Paul 
Wood for drawing my attention to this point.
¹³ Here, this hypothesis appears clearly to be an alternative to the explanation by custom (Hume, 
2000: 195).
(Hume, 2000: 268).¹⁴ But he diverged from Hutcheson’s philosophy at the
beginning of the third book. “Take a wilful murder”, Hume wrote. Where is
the vice? There is a passion, there is a volition. Hume observed, “[h]ere is a matter
of fact [but] ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason.” He continued:
It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character 
to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a 
feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, 
may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern phil-
osophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.
(Hume, 2000: 301; emphasis added)
According to Hume, though there is a perception in the mind that we feel, there 
is no real moral quality that is perceived. The hypothesis of double existence (as 
he called it in the Fourth Part of the first Book) must be avoided, either in the 
case of secondary qualities or in the case of moral qualities.¹⁵ Reid disagreed with 
Hume. Reid maintained that the truth of the proposition “I ought to 
reverence my Maker” does not depend on a feeling or on a sensation (Reid, n.d.: 
4). He extended this attack in the Intellectual Powers: “I cannot help  thinking, 
that a man who determined that there is more moral worth in cruelty, perfidy, and 
injustice, than in generosity, justice, prudence, and temperance, would judge 
wrong whatever his constitution was” (Reid, 2002a: 495, my italics). 
Reid’s meaning of  “whatever his constitution was” represented a rejection of 
Hume’s subjectivism. In this part of the Intellectual Powers, he examined first 
principles of necessary truths and this independence from our constitution might 
seem to be associated with his treatment of them. But, as we shall see,
this independence is true of any truth. In his unpublished manuscript, Reid 
explicitly distinguished his thought from any subjectivism, either in morality or 
in the account of belief. He criticized Hume’s theory of vivacity because it 
rendered the evidence dependent on our constitution. For Reid, truth may 
depend on the attributes that are conceived, or on the relations that the relative 
notion reveals. But it does not depend on our having conceptions, nor on our 
discernment.
¹⁴ Hutcheson had judged “probable, that the Pleasure is not the necessary Result of the Form it 
self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever; but depends upon 
a voluntary Constitution, adapted to preserve the Regularity of the Universe, and is probably not 
the Effect of Necessity but Choice in the Supreme Agent, who constituted our Senses” (Hutcheson, 
2004: 80).
¹⁵ Moreover, unlike Hutcheson, Hume argued that vice is as natural as virtue, whatever is meant by 
“natural” (non-miraculous, habitual, non-artificial), and that selfishness is an original instinct (Hume, 
2000: 304–5, 314, and 372).
An objection might be raised as to the dependence of the constitution in the 
case of knowledge of nominal essences and of secondary qualities. Knowledge 
or notions are considered relative insofar as they depend on the relationship 
between the constitutions of things, mind included. But they are not produced by 
the discernment of the mind. In the fourth essay of Intellectual Powers, 
“On Conception”, Reid maintained that however imperfect (nominal or relative), 
it is true knowledge (Reid, 2002a: 303). For instance, Westminster Bridge is made 
of materials that are the work of God. But as the structure is the work of a man 
(an architect), he can have an adequate conception of it. Reid argued that “though I 
have never seen or heard of it before, if I am only made to conceive that it is a 
bridge from Westminster over the Thames, this conception, however imperfect is 
true” (ibid.). No one could have a conception of the internal constitution of the 
thing. Reid defended that “we must satisfy ourselves” with taking “attributes as 
facts” without deducing them from the real essence of things, but being con-
vinced that “there is a subject to which those attributes belongs” (Reid, 2002a: 
361–2). The only knowledge that we can have of bodies and minds is the 
knowledge of their attributes. Real essence is “above our comprehension”. But 
the nominal essence is not a creature of our mind.
In the case of secondary qualities, Reid believed truth depends on the 
constitution of the things that are related. A secondary quality is the unknown 
cause of a sensation with which we are acquainted. “That smell in the rose is an 
unknown quality or modification which is the cause or occasion of a sensation 
which I know well,” according to Reid. He believed “[t]he relation which this 
unknown quality bears to the sensation with which nature hath connected it, 
is all I learn from the sense of smelling” (Reid, 2002a: 202). Thence, the truth of a 
proposition assuming a perceived smell or colour does not depend on our 
discernment.
Besides, the reason for the contradistinction between contingent truths and 
necessary truths is not that contingent truths depend on our subjective consti-
tution, and necessary truths do not depend on it. Actually, contingent truths are 
factual truths. Discerning them gives knowledge of existent things. Necessary 
truths are truths implied by the ideas or mere conceptions of things. Thus, 
logical and grammatical truths are necessary. Reid thought that moral and 
aesthetical truths were necessary truths too. In the passage quoted earlier, 
Reid wrote that the judgment on the moral worth of cruelty is held “whatever 
our constitution is”. Actually, strictly speaking, neither factual truths nor neces-
sary truths depend on our constitution—only the discernment of contingent 
and necessary truths depends on the narrowness of our powers as powers of 
created beings. Although already implicit in his Inquiry and the sixth essay of
the Intellectual Powers, this distinction is more fully developed in his manu-
script “Of constitution”:
God has given us the faculty of judgment or common Sense. If we had not this faculty 
we could not perceive evidence even in first principles. I conceive this is all that is meant 
by those philosophers who say that they believe first principles, only because they are so 
constituted [ . . . ] But those philosophers in place of giving a reason for the belief of first 
principles, which it is impossible to do, give the cause of this belief, which is truly this 
that we are by our constitution endowed with the faculty of perceiving such first 
principles to be true. That is we have common sense. If a man asks me why I believe that 
twice two are equal to four? I conceive I cannot give him a more proper answer than 
this; I believe it is because I have common sense. But here I do not mean to assign 
common sense as an argument that perswades [sic] me of the truth of this axiom but as 
the faculty by which I discern its truth without any argument, & therefore my belief may 
be resolved into common sense as its cause, but not as a reason of my belief.
(Reid, n.d.: 9–10, emphasis added)¹⁶
Common sense, for Reid, was the “part of our constitution” through which we
discern evidence. Common sense sometimes represented a power of judgment,
sometimes a set of first principles of beliefs, and sometimes all our natural beliefs.
As shown in the introduction to this chapter, Reid entertained a two-sided
meaning of “constitution”: its non-phenomenal nature is unknown but its exist-
ence is discovered by observation. Thus, the power of judgment is only manifest
in the mental operations of believing, which are considered natural insofar as
they occur “by the virtue of” and as “a part of” our constitution. It remains to
understand the connection between the study of our constitution and the iden-
tification of first principles.
In spite of the dualism by which Reid radically distinguished “the constitution
of the material world” from the constitution of the human mind, he advocated
the same method of inquiry in both cases:
We find one phenomenon to be the consequence of another, this of a third, and so on as 
far as we can go, & the farther the better; but we must stop some where and come at last to 
phenomena which cannot resolve into any other. And those ultimate phenomena which 
we cannot account for or resolve we call a part of the constitution of the system, or a law of 
nature. These laws of nature must be the operation of him that made the system, either 
immediate or by means of some subordinate causes which we have not discovered. Some
¹⁶ In the Inquiry, Reid wrote: “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the 
constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted 
in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call 
the principles of common sense” (Reid, 1997: 33, emphasis added). In the Intellectual Powers, he 
claimed “such is the constitution of the human mind, that evidence discerned by us, forces a 
corresponding degree of assent” (Reid, 2002a: 481, emphasis added).
II. Why Does the Discernment of Truth Depend
on Our Constitution?
According to Reid, descriptions of evidence in the philosophy of mind must treat
evidence as truthful. Evidence represents a value, although in its description
evidence is regarded as a fact.¹⁷ Reid explained:
We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of belief [ . . . ] What this evidence is,
is more easily felt than described. Those who never reflected upon its nature, feel its
influence in governing their belief. It is the business of the Logician to explain its nature
and to distinguish its various kinds and degrees. (Reid, 2002a: 228–9)
The difficulty of evidence “more easily felt than described”, for Reid, involves not
reducing it to a bare feeling. Otherwise, logicians run the risk of being charged
with subjectivism and scepticism. In the Intellectual Powers, Reid recalled that
“first principles, or intuitive judgments” must be distinguished from judgments
“which may be ascribed to the power of reasoning”. The former are expressed by
propositions that are “no sooner understood than they are believed”, in contrast
to the latter, which are inferred from another proposition (Reid, 2002a: 452–3).
This presents the problem: does tracing discernment to the fact that this power of
¹⁷ On the ‘linking-up between questions of fact and questions of value’, see Rysiew, 2002, 2015.
part therefore of the constitution of the system is always the last result of our physical 
enquiries when we proceed analytically [sic]; and to be assumed as a first principle when 
we would explain the phenomena of nature synthetically. (Reid, n.d.: 1)
A law of nature or a part of the constitution was an ultimate phenomenon which 
must be accounted for as an original fact. It was a nescient result of an inquiry 
into the causes which, being regressive, was analytical and which stops for 
negative reasons when an investigation could not proceed and further. But it 
could be considered as a first principle from a synthetic point of view, when it 
satisfactorily “explains” the subordinate phenomenon. Indeed, laws of nature 
were operations of the maker and in the case of the natural constitution, efficacy 
was the operation of the transcendent Creator. Another inquirer may later 
discern the details of such an explanation by discovering how this original fact 
occurs (Reid, 1997: 15). We have now to examine why, in the philosophy of 
mind, the first principles of common sense were principles of evidence, which are 
eventually termed “principles of truth”.
judgment is part of our constitution beg the question? Undoubtedly, Reid, in a 
way, presupposed the truthfulness of our faculties. The objective of this section is 
to define his intentions in making such a presupposition. The literature focuses 
on addressing what allowed Reid to think that our natural beliefs are justified or 
are true knowledge. This issue involves two further questions: why did Reid claim 
that the first principles of truth were intuitive and was he justified in dismissing 
scepticism as irrelevant? Contributions to this subject often underline pragmatist 
arguments that involve an implicit acknowledgement of evidence as evidence. 
This consideration, however, mainly concerns the justification of our beliefs.¹⁸ 
But Reid sought an explanation for our true beliefs. This explanation necessarily 
entails a justificatory ingredient, since it must explain the fact that they are 
justified or warranted. Reid did not simply claim that knowledge was a natural or 
a divine gift. His inquiry into our constitution showed how natural powers 
operate and how they give us access to reality. In doing so, he applied a method 
depicted in the manuscript “Of constitution”, which demonstrated that his 
approach could not be reduced to the mysterious appeal to common sense 
condemned by Priestley.
According to Reid, the task of logic was not to find reasons for self-evidence. 
On the contrary, logic described every kind of evidence (e.g. perception, memory, 
deductive inference, probable induction, etc.). Note that a reason for a belief is 
only one of several kinds of evidence, namely an inferential one. The logical 
accounting for evidence seems to introduce a reason for it when it says that the 
ability to discern evidence is part of our constitution, which is the work of God. 
In order to avoid Hume’s mistake, Reid argued that our beliefs must be treated as 
bare effects of the operations of our mind, and we must not reduce evidence to a 
psychological effect without any normative value. But Reid clearly indicated that 
the self-evidence of perception, remembrance, induction, and so on, was not 
conveyed by such a reason. Reid wrote:
Shall we say, then, that this belief is the inspiration of the Almighty? I think this may be 
said in a good sense; for I take it to be the immediate effect of our constitution, which is 
the work of the Almighty. But if inspiration be understood to imply a persuasion of its 
coming from God, our belief of the objects of sense is not inspiration; for a man would 
believe his senses though he had no notion of a Deity. He who is persuaded that he is the 
workmanship of God, and that it is a part of his constitution to believe his senses, may 
think that a good reason to confirm his belief. But he had the belief before he could give 
this or any other reason for it. (Reid, 2002a: 231–2)
¹⁸ See Rysiew, 2002, 2015; Jaffro, 2010; Poore, 2015.
Reid distinguished between natural belief, which assents to evidence but does not 
need to believe in God to do so, and philosophical confirmation of belief, an 
acknowledgement that natural belief is a “part of our constitution” (common 
sense) as “the workmanship of God”. The veracity of God is a reason from which 
the conclusion that our natural faculties were truthful is drawn. But we do not 
need this philosophical justification to discern perceptual, memorial, and other 
kinds of evidence.¹⁹ Focusing on the justification for our natural beliefs, therefore, 
did not fully explain Reid’s intentions. We have to determine the explanatory 
function of the inquiry into our constitution. The hypothesis that will be devel-
oped in this chapter is the following one: to say that our beliefs are about real 
things according to the laws of our nature is to attribute this to the exertion of 
powers instituted by a Transcendent Being. This belief assists understanding facts 
that are observed when we reflect on evidence, because perceptual belief tran-
scends sensation, inductive belief transcends past experience, and testimonial 
belief transcends words heard.
The first principles, for Reid, represent laws of nature that must explain 
conceiving an attribute or a relation that does not depend on our having 
conception, and that we believe in an existence that does not depend on our 
discernment. They do so because explaining instinctive belief as self-evident is 
tantamount to describing the operation of transcendence. On suggestion at the 
beginning of the Inquiry, Reid wrote:
Why sensation should compel our belief of the present existence of the thing, memory a 
belief of its past existence, and imagination no belief at all, I believe no philosopher can 
give a shadow of reason, but that such is the nature of these operations: they are simple 
and original, and therefore inexplicable acts of the mind. (Reid, 1997: 28)
The ultimate fact, for Reid, involves acknowledging that a sensation is necessarily 
taken as a sign of the thing, which is conceived as existent in the perception. 
Analytically, we cannot say more. But synthetically, the law of suggestion 
explains every thing that needs to be explained: (1) why we perceive one thing 
(the extra-mental thing) and why the perception does not have two objects (one 
in my mind and an extra-mental one); (2) why the belief in its existence is not 
concluded from another reason. This is explained only by the fact that there is a 
metaphysical gap between sensation and perception that is transcended by a 
power given in our constitution. Rebecca Copenhaver and Keith De Rose stress 
that there is an “external relation” between the sensation and the object of 
perception, or in Reid’s words, there is “no connection that arises necessarily
¹⁹ See Poore, 2015.
from the nature of the things”, especially no similitude.²⁰ As we cannot have a 
perception without having any sensation, there is, however, a connection, which 
is attested by the regularities of experience. But it does not stem from the nature 
of the things. Even in the case of the perception of secondary qualities, although 
the way we describe the object of perception (the extra-mental thing) depends on 
the sensation, there is no similitude, as we have seen, between the nature of the 
secondary quality and the nature of the sensation. The laws of our constitution 
can explain the fact that we are in the presence of the thing only if they are the 
way in which transcendence, as it were, operates within us.
Transcendence is still at work in other beliefs about reality, testimonial and 
inductive beliefs included. It is at work, in fact, when we naturally interpret any 
thing as a sign. In addition to sensation, indeed, there are two other kinds of 
natural signs: natural language (gesture) and natural causes (Reid, 1997: 58–
61).²¹ In the latter case, by virtue of repeated observations, we simultaneously 
discover that some thing is a sign and learn its interpretation through experience. 
Then, another first principle describes the “external relation” between past 
experience and future expectation: the inductive principle. Although Reid agreed 
with Hume’s observation that there is no reason by which the expectation is 
inferred from past experience, he opposed Hume’s position on the fact of nature 
involved in our probable belief. Reid, in contrast, tried to account for inductive 
evidence as genuine grounds for belief and can only do so by appealing to “the 
constitution of human nature” that “ties together [ . . . ]  those things which were 
in their nature unconnected” (Reid, 1997: 50). In the case of natural language, 
without any induction, we know that a specific facial expression signifies a 
particular emotion. In an analogy between perceptive evidence and testimonial 
evidence Reid showed that testimonial belief was a belief about the same things 
signified by the speaker’s discourse, and not only about the speaker’s belief. The 
object of belief is the thing itself and not any mental object in the speaker’s mind 
or in the hearer’s mind (nor inferred through this mental object). Artificial signs 
are not only linguistic signs, but signs of reality by virtue of our constitution. To 
account for testimonial belief, the naturalist must describe transcendence.
Although Reid does not employ the term “transcendence” in this context, 
phenomenology currently allows us to use it in the philosophy of mind. More-
over, the term occurred in the nineteenth-century reception of Reid’s writings,
²⁰ Copenhaver, 2004. See also De Rose, 1989 and Buras, 2009. For a different approach, perhaps 
overlooking the metaphysical gap, see Pappas, 1989.
²¹ Sensation suggests a thing of which we had never before any notion or conception (Reid, 1997: 
59), although facial expression and signs of natural language suggest some things notions of which 
are given by nature (Reid, 1997: 51).
 
which proves relevant for two reasons.²² First, it appropriately denotes the typical 
gap (i.e. the absence of necessary connection) that is observed in any exertion of 
true power. Reid argued that “[p]ower in the proper sense is under the command 
of him who has the power, and we cannot infer the act from the power because 
there is no necessary connection between them” (Reid, 2003: 21–2, my emphasis). 
This gap occurs both in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of nature. 
The power exerted in perception is as transcendent as the power exerted in 
gravitation. Notwithstanding, when applied to the typical gap observed in our 
mental operations, the term is relevant for another reason. In perception, induc-
tion, and testimonial belief, the gap is not only observed (as it was in the science of 
nature), it is crossed. It would appear odd to call the gap between a so-called cause 
and a so-called effect observed in external nature (‘so-called’ because signs of 
each other) “transcendent”. Notwithstanding, in the philosophy of mind, the 
experience of perception (and induction, testimony) proves to be experience of 
self-transcendence. Close examination of this mental operation shows that there 
is no reason why we conceive a thing and believe that it exists when we have a 
particular sensation. And yet we do conceive and believe in this external 
existence. Referring to our constitution as ‘God’s workmanship’, the anatomist 
of the mind is in a position to account for this mental gap-crossing without 
overlooking the gap.
In Reid’s version of common sense philosophy, a first principle provides an 
explanation. It is a law of nature that describes some induced regularities, 
produced by an agency. Reid’s methodology in “Of constitution” suggests that, in 
the philosophy of mind, first principles are mental facts. Nonetheless in the 
Intellectual Powers, Reid’s enunciation of the first principles of contingent truths 
is ambiguous. For instance, the first does not consist in holding that every 
affirmation of the existence of every thing of which I am conscious is true. Reid 
rather claims: “I hold as a first principle the existence of every thing of which I 
am conscious.” In the published work, the existence of the thing is the alleged first 
principle. Although my aim is not to deny this ambiguity, the examination of 
what the first principles have to account for (namely evidence as such) helps to 
explain why Reid made the enunciation of the first principles in such forms. 
Since Reid treated the first principles as laws of nature, which must explain our 
discernment of truth as such, he concluded they were first principles
²² In a note in an abridged edition of Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, James 
Walker quotes a lecture given by the French translator of Reid’s works, Theodore Jouffroy: “From 
the results of observation, and solely by the application to these results of a conception of reason, the 
mind arrives at a consequence that transcends them” (Reid, 1854a: 444).
III. Conclusion
By claiming that Reid’s theism “helps the reliabilism”, Philip De Bary hints that it
“gives an explanation for the reliability of the faculties” (De Bary, 2002: 187–8). If
we are right, indeed, Reid’s reference to God explains their reliability because
it makes sense of the observation made by the philosopher when he sees that they
cross the gap. Reid’s belief that our faculties were part of God’s creation makes
intelligible the self-transcendence described in Section II. It did not, however,
imply that Reid intended to demonstrate their truthfulness or to refute the sceptic
by proving first that our constitution is not delusive. Indeed, Reid’s answer to the
²³ Undoubtedly, there is a shift. Another ambiguity is often pointed out in the literature: are the
first principles propositions, objects or beliefs taken for granted? On this point, see Van Cleve, 1999
and Wolterstorff, 2004.
²⁴ Letter to Lord Kames, 16 December 1780 in Reid, 2002b: 145.
of truth. The first principle was the fact that we discern the truth of the existence 
of every thing of which we are conscious as truth. This explains why, for Reid, the 
first principle was the existence of this thing.²³
In the case of material phenomena, agency is external to any material thing. 
The philosophy of material nature would not perform any explanatory 
function if there were no agent transcendent to matter, and there is no 
evidence that active principles can be inherent to matter.²⁴ Now, in the case of 
mental phenomena, a first principle provides an explanation of our perception 
of evidence. Remarkably, there is no need to learn by induction that there is a 
law of nature in mental phenomena to follow it. By feeling a sensation of 
hardness we instinctively know the cohesion of the parts of the thing we are 
touching. We do not need to know that divine agency is at work. Reid believed 
divine agency was involved in our mental operation. The explanatory function of 
the philosophy of mind is only performed if the philosopher, who proceeds 
first analytically and then synthetically, becomes aware that this transcendent 
agency is at work. Here, agency is not incompatible with the nature of the 
subject since this subject is not material—it is the mind as such. The mind is 
not the agent of the mental operation but the thing in which there is an activity 
consisting in transcending the nature of our feeling, sensation, hearing, and so 
on. Now we can address the suspicion that the appeal to our mental constitu-
tion is a refuge of ignorance in Reid’s philosophy of mind, especially the fear 
that Reid’s reply to the sceptic begs the question by presupposing that the mind 
is a knowing subject.
²⁶ See Etchegaray, 2013: 142–5.
sceptic did not consist in saying that because they are God’s creation, our faculties 
are reliable, but rather in using “the means which Nature has furnished” in order 
to bring controversies about first principles to an issue: the unprejudiced use of 
judgment, the sense of ridicule, and some “track-record arguments” (Reid, 2002a: 
461–7).²⁵ These means aimed at awakening the sense of evidence by prompting 
the exercise of common sense, not at demonstrating that the sceptic was wrong 
by inferring the reliability of our faculties from our non-delusive constitution.²⁶ 
In particular Reid did not think that the reliability must be concluded from a 
demonstrative reason, as, for instance, from the divine origin of our constitution. 
He believed that if led to reflect on his own mental experience, the sceptic would 
confess that he always implicitly acknowledges evidence as a just ground of belief. 
Reid admitted that it would be impossible to demonstrate that our constitution 
was suited to discerning evidence. In the manuscript “Of constitution”, he con-
ceded that our constitution might appear contingent for two reasons: (1) either 
the Maker of this constitution might “have given us one part of it without an 
other, for instance the power of perceiving mathematical or physical truths 
without the power of perceiving moral truths”, or (2) he might “have given a 
contrary constitution so as that what we now perceive to be true either in 
morality or in other things, should by means of that other constitution be 
perceived to be false” (Reid, n.d.: 3). These possibilities were not incongruent with 
God’s omnipotence. Regarding the role of sensation, Reid considered that we 
cannot conceive a perceived object without it. Perhaps God could have made us 
in another way. This offered an explanation for why he wrote that it was a “cause 
or occasion”. “Occasion” referred to a fact without which perception does not 
occur given our actual constitution, but which could have been absent in another 
created nature. Moreover, logic did not require a demonstration to rule out the 
possibility that God was a great deceiver. Having no reason to think that our 
constitution was fallacious, Reid sought to describe our cognitive powers by 
reference to the transcendence at work in it. Refusing the burden of proof, and 
finding no reason for suspicion, Reid developed a realistic philosophy of mind. 
We have shown why experimental theism provided him with adequate means to 
achieve this objective. References to God are very expedient to assist the
²⁵ “Conceiving that the testimony of our senses, and of all our faculties, excepting that of 
consciousness, ought not to be taken for granted, but to be proved by argument” was Descartes’ 
mistake according to Reid. “Other men, from the beginning of the world, had taken for granted, as a 
first principle, the truth and reality of what they perceive by their senses, and from thence inferred 
the existence of a Supreme Author and Maker of the world” (Reid, 2002a: 515). Reid’s criticism of 
Descartes’ circle is widely stressed from Alston, 1985 to Poore, 2015.
philosopher for the description of evidence, and such assistance is useless to 
convince the sceptic.
In this approach, is the mind a knowing subject?²⁷ Section I has shown that the 
proper method for the philosophy of mind must avoid subjectivism. The mind is 
termed ‘a subject’ in the sense of a SUBJECTUM to which discernment is 
inherent. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Essay on the Intellectual Powers, 
Reid introduced the following “principle taken for granted [ . . . that the] very 
operation we are conscious of supposes an agent that operates, which we call 
mind” (Reid, 2002a: 42). In doing so, we conceive our mind as ours only through 
common sense. On the second of the first principles, Reid argued “that the 
thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, 
my mind, my person” and again, on the sixth that “we have some degree of power 
over our actions” and consequently that we are “agents” (Reid, 2002a: 472). 
Certainly, we may believe that we have some degree of power over our mental 
acts. In other passages, Reid suggested that this power is mainly a power of 
attention (Reid, 2002a: 64). Thus, the mind can function to some degree as an 
agent—at least we have a natural belief that it can play such a role. For instance, 
we believe (we know, strictly speaking, according to Reid) that we could perceive 
better. But the laws of our mental constitution remain the creature of another 
agent, its Creator.²⁸ Our agency is exerted only in the use of law-governed 
intellectual powers.²⁹ In Reid’s work, the notion of subject in the sense of self, 
agent, and person occurred through a belief that stems from the transcendent 
efficacy of our nature. This modern concept of subject is not a philosophical 
requisite to answering the sceptic, nor to describing our mental operations.
For this reason, the Reidian response to scepticism departed from a Cartesian 
order and did not presuppose the mind as a transcendental subject of knowledge. 
A ‘Cartesian order’ is the name that Reid would willingly apply to the following: 
first I know that I exist as a self, and then and only then, I have to prove that the 
other objects of my ideas are existent too, thanks to God’s veracity.³⁰ Reid’s logic 
and response to the sceptic involved a naturalistic method (a method examining 
the nature of things, mind included) that required an appeal to God’s efficacy
²⁷ On the role and significance of Reid’s concepts in the emergence of the modern subject, see De 
Libera, 2008, 2014.
²⁸ On the distinction between operation and action, activity and agency of the mind, see Jaffro, 
2014.
²⁹ Strictly speaking, an active power is not law-governed.
³⁰ Although this interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations is questionable, it is Reid’s own. Actually 
Descartes does not proceed so in the Meditations. But this is the way Reid introduces it (2002a: 115–
16).
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